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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ExxonMobil has requested refunds of severance taxes based on the correct 
interpretation of applicable severance tax laws. ExxonMobil believes it is entitled to 
these refunds because, when this Court interpreted the statutes in question, it held that "as 
to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only." 
ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm% 2003 UT 53, % 23, 86 P.3d 706, 712. 
ExxonMobil believes that the Commission's refusal to issue the refunds ignores this 
Court's ruling that the prospective effect limitation applied to "other parties" besides 
ExxonMobil. Id., ^24. Alternatively, ExxonMobil has asked this Court to reverse the 
prospective effect limitation because (1) the ExxonMobil decision did not create new law; 
and (2) the ExxonMobil Court's determination that refunds "would pose a great burden" 
was based on erroneous assumptions and allegations. 
The Commission claims that it correctly interpreted ExxonMobil and that the 
prospective relief granted to ExxonMobil was limited to the claims before the 
ExxonMobil Court in 2003. In response to ExxonMobil's request for reversal of the 
prospective relief limitation, the Commission alleges that the threshold requirement that a 
decision create "new law" does not apply and that courts have nearly unfettered discretion 
to refuse to retroactively apply decisions in matters of statutory interpretation. 
Commission's Brief, p. 24. The Amici Funds oppose reversal of the prospective relief 
limitation claiming that the limitation was imposed in accordance with established 
1 
precedent and that its reversal would result in a windfall to the taxpayers and would 
irreparably damage the Amici Funds.1 These allegations are incorrect and not supported 
by the record. 
This Court's unprecedented decision to give prospective effect to a decision which 
did not establish new law has been interpreted by the Commission to authorize millions of 
dollars in deficiency assessments against taxpayers who had paid their taxes based on the 
correct interpretation of the severance tax statutes. ExxonMobil has warned that the 
ExxonMobil precedent will ensure that, when an agency's persistent misinterpretation of a 
statute is corrected, the agency can request a prospective relief limitation and, on the 
strength of that limitation, retroactively enforce its misinterpretation. Neither the 
Commission nor the Amici Funds have denied that this is exactly what occurred after the 
ExxonMobil Court imposed the prospective relief limitation. If this Court does not 
reverse that limitation, then the meaning of a statute is determined by an agency until this 
Court rules on the correct interpretation. This result suspends the role of the legislature in 
creating laws until this Court provides the correct interpretation. Until then, an agency is 
free to misinterpret and misapply law with the added assurance that its misinterpretation 
will be enforceable until the day the Court corrects the agency's misinterpretation. The 
1
 Amici Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and Navajo Revitalization Fund 
(collectively "Amici Funds") have filed a brief opposing ExxonMobil's request that the 
Court reverse the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation. The Amici Funds' Brief does 
not address the first issues raised by ExxonMobil's appeal- that the Commission erred 
when it narrowly interpreted the scope of the prospective relief limitation. 
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Commission has not denied that this outcome can only be prevented by reversal of the 
prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobil. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EXXONMOBIL IS ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED REFUNDS UNDER 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION. 
In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil2 explained that, when a court fashions a 
prospective relief limitation it has 'Various available options" which include giving 
"limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal" or "only to the case in which the new 
principle is announced and to those cases initiated in the future." ExxonMobil's Opening 
Brief, p. 14, quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 862 P.2d 1348, 1350 
(Utah 1993); In re Twin Parks Ltd. Partnership, 720 F.2d 1374, 1376 (4th Cir. 1983); and 
RioAlgom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 1984). 
The Commission has taken the position that the ExxonMobil prospective relief 
limitation "only applies to the claims presented" in 2003 to the ExxonMobil Court. The 
Commission argues that the Court has never expanded selective prospectivity to include 
claims not before it and, therefore, such an interpretation cannot be permitted in this case. 
The Commission's response is wrong for several reasons. First, the scope of a 
prospective relief limitation is established by the Court's plain language which, in this 
case, would permit additional claims by ExxonMobil and MEPNA. Kennecott, 862 P.2d 
2
 Petitioners ExxonMobil and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Mobil Exploration and 
Producing ("MEPNA"), are collectively referred to herein as "ExxonMobil." 
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at 1350. Second, contrary to the Commission's claim, this Court has fashioned 
prospective relief limitations which permit retroactive application of a new rule to claims 
not raised by the original complaint. The scope of a prospective relief limitation is 
established on a case-by-case basis and the limitation imposed by the ExxonMobil Court 
is not presumed to be the same as the limitations imposed by the Court in other cases. 
Third, the Commission's characterization of ExxonMobil's interpretation as "expanding 
the remand order of the Court" is wrong. Finally, the Commission's claim that its 
interpretation furthers the Court's stated judicial policy is an ineffective response to the 
concerns raised by ExxonMobil. The Commission did not respond to ExxonMobil's 
discussion regarding the errors underlying that policy and it ignores the fact that the Court 
had already weighed its concerns against ExxonMobil's right to relief and concluded that 
the prospective relief limitation would not apply to ExxonMobil. 
A. The Plain Language of the ExxonMobil Decision Supports the 
Application of the Correct Interpretation of the Severance Tax 
Provisions to the Refund Requests by ExxonMobil. 
The Commission's interpretation of the prospective relief limitation is based 
entirely on the ExxonMobil Court's statement remanding the claims before it for "further 
adjudication." ExxonMobil, % 24. According to the Commission, the Court's reference to 
those claims must be interpreted as establishing the entire scope of the Court's retroactive 
relief even though the Court clearly stated that "whether in refund requests or deficiency 
4 
proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil, the rule announced today is to have prospective 
application only." Id, % 23 (emphasis added). 
In Kennecott, this Court recognized that it had 'Various available options" for 
fashioning a prospective relief limitation, including "giv[ing] the holding retroactive 
effect as to the litigants or others who have litigation pending." 862 P.2d at 1350, quoting 
Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. The plain language of the ExxonMobil prospective relief 
limitation denied retroactive effect "as to all but ExxonMobil." ExxonMobil, ^ 23. The 
Commission's dependence on the Court's remand of the claims before it as establishing 
the scope of the limitation, ignores the subsequent articulation of the limitation by the 
Court as applying only to "other parties" besides ExxonMobil. The Commission fails to 
explain how the Court's refusal to apply the ExxonMobil decision to "otherparties who 
may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the 
Tax Commission" forbids any additional claims by ExxonMobil, the only party to which 
the prospective relief limitation does not apply. Id. Tf 24 (emphasis added). 
In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil supported its interpretation of the prospective 
relief limitation by showing that the Division had given the same interpretation to the 
plain language of the prospective relief limitation until January 18, 2008. Opening Brief, 
p. 15, n. 5 (Division Manager testified that MEPNA's 1999 refund request was approved 
because the Division believed ExxonMobil permitted additional claims, see R. 88:11-16). 
In its Response, the Commission has ignored the fact that the Division interpreted the 
5 
prospective relief limitation to authorize additional refunds, as well as the Commission's 
own acknowledgment that language within the ExxonMobil decision could "be interpreted 
to allow other claims by ExxonMobil." Id, p. 19, citing Order, p. 11 (R. 519). 
The plain language used by the ExxonMobil Court to define the scope of the 
prospective relief limitation clearly established that ExxonMobil could not be denied the 
right to rely on the correct interpretation of the severance tax provisions. The Division's 
interpretation of that language (until January 2008) as permitting additional relief 
supports the finding that the ExxonMobil Court's plain language permitted retroactive 
application of the decision to ExxonMobil. The Commission exceeded its authority when 
it "interpreted] the Court's retroactive application narrowly," and refused to retroactively 
apply the ExxonMobil decision to ExxonMobil. Order, p. 10 (R. 518). 
B. The Scope of The Prospective Relief Limitation Is Unique in Every 
Case And, in this Case, it Permits ExxonMobil to Bring Additional 
Refund Claims. 
The Commission argues that the prospective relief limitation bars ExxonMobil's 
claims because, according to the Commission, this Court has never imposed a prospective 
relief limitation which permits parties to pursue claims which had not been pending at the 
time the limitation was imposed. Commission's Brief, pp. 14-16. In support of this 
claim, the Commission mischaracterizes this Court's holding in V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1996), vacated on rehearing, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1997), stating that the decision was applied "retroactively to the claims of 
6 
unconstitutionality raised before the Court and prospectively to all other claims." Id., 
p. 15. 
In V-1 Oil, the taxpayer filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in 
March 1994. The Court issued its decision on October 29, 1996. The V-1 Court 
specifically held that its decision "is retroactive to the year in which V-1 alleges it began 
to pay the surcharge subject only to any applicable statutes of limitation." 942 P.2d at 
915. The Court's decision to grant retroactive relief to V-1 for all claims not barred by 
the statute of limitations would have allowed V-1 to obtain refiinds for surcharges paid on 
motor fuels after it had filed the complaint, including payments made before the Court 
issued its decision. 
Just as the V-1 Court's prospective relief limitation would have allowed V-1 to 
obtain refunds for tax overpayments which had yet not occurred when the original 
complaint was filed, the ExxonMobil Court also fashioned a prospective relief limitation 
which permitted ExxonMobil to pursue its refund requests for severance tax 
overpayments which were not part of the original ExxonMobil proceeding. 
In every case in which this Court has imposed a prospective relief limitation, that 
limitation is crafted in response to the unique set of circumstances which exist in each 
case. Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1350 (In adopting a prospective relief limitation, court has 
"various available options"); In re Twin Parks Ltd, Partnership, 720 F.2d at 1376 
("Tribunals announcing new principles of law, however, qualify their retroactivity in 
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differing ways, and the new principles' effect on cases then existing in various stages of 
litigation differ accordingly Ultimately, the prospective or retroactive effects of a 
new rule depend upon the enunciating court's intention."). The Commission's claim that 
all prospective relief limitations imposed by this Court have the same parameters is 
simply wrong and provides no basis to interpret the ExxonMobil prospective relief 
limitation as advocated by the Commission. 
C. ExxonMobil Has Not Asked the Court to "Expand the Remand Order 
of the Court." 
The Commission claims it was powerless to provide the relief requested by 
ExxonMobil because it would have been expanding the Court's order to remand the claim 
before it. Ironically, it is the Commission which has departed from the scope of that 
Order when, by its own admission, it "interpreted] the Court's retroactive application 
narrowly." Order, p. 10 (R. 518)(emphasis added). 
The order of remand referred to by the Commission consists of the following 
statement by the ExxonMobil Court: 
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a 
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our 
holding is to apply prospectively only. 
ExxonMobil, \ 24. Pursuant to that Order, a hearing was held before the Commission 
after which the Commission determined that ExxonMobil was entitled to refunds for 
severance taxes paid by MEPNA from 1993 through 1998. 
8 
The Commission's claim that ExxonMobil's interpretation of the prospective relief 
limitation would expand the Court's remand order makes no sense. The order remanding 
the claims before the ExxonMobil Court is not a limitation on the retroactive application 
of the ExxonMobil decision. There is no language in that remand order to suggest that the 
refund claims before the ExxonMobil Court were the only claims to which the 
ExxonMobil decision could be retroactively applied. To the contrary, when declaring the 
prospective application of the ExxonMobil decision, the Court singled out ExxonMobil as 
being entirely exempt from that restriction: 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application 
only. 
ExxonMobil, % 23 (emphasis added). 
The Commission also asserts that the additional claims should not be permitted 
because the ExxonMobil Court did not intend to create a "favored entity." Commission's 
Brief, p. 18. This is not correct. A prospective effect limitation which permits retroactive 
application of a "new rule" to certain named parties, by its very nature, creates a "favored 
entity." Rio Algom Corp., 681 P.2d at 196 (retroactive effect given to six plaintiff-
taxpayers who were parties to the appeal); V-l Oil Co., 942 P.2d at 914 (decision only 
retroactive for V-l). 
The Court has deemed the creation of the "favored entity" to be essential because 
prospective application of the "new rule" to litigants "would have the potential of 
9 
discouraging other litigants from challenging statutes of questionable validity." Id. This 
Court has observed, "It would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant who has sustained 
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the fruits of victory." Id. The 
ExxonMobil Court recognized that ExxonMobil had "expended considerable time and 
resources to attack the actions of the Tax Commission" and refused to "deprive 
ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory." ExxonMobil, 1f 23. The Commission has entirely 
disregarded those concerns and has forced ExxonMobil to expend considerable additional 
time and resources to obtain the relief to which it believes it is expressly entitled under 
the ExxonMobil decision. 
The Commission also suggests that the prospective effect limitation should be 
interpreted to exclude the refund claims by ExxonMobil and MEPNA because, it 
contends, the Court was not aware of those potential claims in 2003. Order, p. 10 
(R. 382)("[ExxonMobiPs] interpretation greatly extends the Court's limited retroactive 
application to refund requests unknown to the Court at the time of the decision"); 
Commission's Brief, p. 18 ("the scope of the claims, the years at issue, and the amounts at 
issue are all well beyond the scope of the [ExxonMobil] claim."). Ironically the 
Commission has upheld the Division's post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments which 
were based on the misinterpretation of applicable law even though those assessments 
were unknown to the Court at the time of the decision. See, e.g. Union Oil Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, Case No. 20080068-SC (appeal of Commission's decision upholding 
10 
post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments). The Commission's willingness to enforce 
unanticipated post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments based on rejected statutory 
interpretations of severance tax law simply cannot be reconciled with its claim that the 
refund requests, which are based on the correct interpretation of severance tax law, are 
barred because they were "unknown to the [ExxonMobil] Court." The fact that the Court 
did not discuss or anticipate specific claims which were eventually asserted by 
ExxonMobil in a timely manner does not mean that those claims are barred. 
By its own admission, the Commission "interpreted] the Court's retroactive 
application narrowly to only include the 'refund request' before the Court in 
ExxonMobil." Order, p. 10 (R. 518). That Court specifically declared that the "as to all 
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application." The 
Commission did not have the authority to narrow the scope of this Court's order and 
deprive ExxonMobil of the retroactive application of ExxonMobil 
D. The Commission Has Inadequately Responded to ExxonMobil's Claim 
That it Erred When it Interpreted the Prospective Relief Limitation 
Narrowly to Further Flawed Policy Considerations. 
ExxonMobil devoted seven pages of its brief to a discussion of why the 
Commission erred when it held that the ExxonMobil Court's "policy considerations 
[were] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application narrowly to include 
only the 'refund request' before the court in ExxonMobil Corporation." Order, p. 10 
(R. 383). See Opening Brief, pp. 23-30. In that section of the Brief, ExxonMobil 
11 
explained that the ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the interests of the litigant 
against its fiscal concerns and concluded that ExxonMobil was entitled to retroactive 
application of the decision. ExxonMobil explained that the Commission erred when it 
narrowly interpreted of the scope of the prospective relief limitation "to broadly protect 
the small government entities from other refund requests not before it," Order, p. 10 
(R. 383), inasmuch as, in so doing, the Commission was giving greater weight to the 
Court's fiscal concerns than the Court itself had given. The Commission has not 
responded to ExxonMobil's claim that the Commission's decision to narrow the 
prospective relief limitation is an impermissible re-weighing of the interests of the parties 
to ExxonMobil and effectively deprives ExxonMobil of the "fruits of victory" to which 
this Court had determined ExxonMobil was entitled. ExxonMobil, \ 23. 
ExxonMobil also explained that the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret 
the prospective relief limitation ignored the long-standing policy of interpreting 
applicable law in favor of the taxpayer. The Commission did not respond to 
ExxonMobil's claim that the Commission's willingness to infer unarticulated limitations 
impermissibly limited the scope of relief available to ExxonMobil. 
Finally, ExxonMobil detailed the knowledge the Commission had of factual errors 
which formed the basis of the ExxonMobil Court's decision to adopt the prospective relief 
limitation. The Commission has not denied that it was fiilly aware of these factual errors 
at the time it issued the Order, nor has it explained why it narrowly interpreted the 
12 
prospective relief limitation to further policy considerations which the Commission knew 
were based on mistakes of fact.3 
Prior to the Commission's decision in this matter, ExxonMobil demonstrated that 
the ExxonMobil Court's concern for Amici Funds was misplaced inasmuch as the only 
evidence provided to this Court proves that severance tax refunds are issued from the 
State's General Fund and the Amici Funds are not affected. Opening Brief, p. 29. It also 
demonstrated that there were no other "small governmental entities" implicated by the 
severance tax refund actions. Id. at 28.4 In addition, ExxonMobil established that 
severance taxes are only remitted to Amici Funds when the wells are located on Indian 
lands. Yet the prospective relief limitation has been applied to all wells, regardless of 
where they are located. Id. 
Just as the Commission failed to respond to Unocal's explanation that the 
ExxonMobil Court's policy considerations were based on erroneous assumptions, the 
Commission continues to ignore and fails to rebut evidence that the ExxonMobil Court's 
policy concerns were unfounded. It has not explained why it narrowly interpreted the 
3
 The Amici Funds have denied ExxonMobil's claims that the prospective relief 
limitation was based on factual errors. However, those denials relate to ExxonMobil's 
request that this Court reverse the prospective relief limitation, and are discussed below at 
II.C. The discussion in this section specifically addresses the Commission's failure to 
respond to ExxonMobil's claims that it narrowed the prospective relief limitation to 
further policy considerations which it knew were based on factual errors. 
4
 The Amici Funds contend that the Oil and Gas Conservation Account will be 
depleted by refunds, but that account consists of conservation fees, refunds of which were 
not sought in the ExxonMobil appeal. 
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prospective relieve limitation to further policy considerations which it knew to be flawed. 
The Commission's bald assertion that its interpretation "is consistent with the Court's 
prior application of the doctrine of selective prospectivity and the Court's stated 
rationalization for its application" is non-responsive and insufficient to justify the 
Commission's narrowing of the prospective relief limitation. Commission's Brief, p. 19. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE FULL 
RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION. 
If the Court affirms the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the 
ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation to deny ExxonMobil retroactive application of 
that decision, then ExxonMobil has requested that this Court reverse its decision to give 
only prospective effect to the ExxonMobil decision. In Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 
1032, 1025 (Utah 1991), this Court reversed a prospective relief limitation, stating "we 
now recognize that in so stating the law, we did not examine carefully the basis for that 
decision." This precedent clearly establishes that this Court may reverse the prospective 
relief limitation if it concludes that it did not carefully examine the basis for limiting the 
application of its decision. 
A. ExxonMobil Does Not Bear a "Substantial Burden of Persuasion" in 
Requesting Reversal of the Prospective Relief Limitation. 
The Commission claims that ExxonMobil faces a "substantial burden of 
persuasion" in asking this Court to reverse the prospective relief limitation. 
Commission's Brief, p. 24, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). The 
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Commission's characterization of the standard is incorrect and ignores the clarification 
offered by the Menzies Court. After stating that "[t]hose asking us to overturn prior 
precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion," the Menzies Court explained that 
"[t]his burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis." Id. The Court then explained 
that stare decisis "does not require that a panel adhere to its own . . . prior decisions with 
the same inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis." Id, p. 399, n. 3. Thus, the Court 
held that "a panel may overrule its own or another panel's decision where 'the decision is 
clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision 
inapplicable.'"Id, quoting State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1986); accord Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91. 
The one time this Court reversed its imposition of a prospective relief limitation, it 
did so based simply on a finding that "it did not examine carefully the basis for that 
decision." Van Dyke, 818 P.2dat 1025. The Van Dyke Court explained that, in Stoker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Court had overruled a boundary-by-
acquiescence test which had been established several years earlier in Halladay v. Cluff, 
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Court applied the Halliday standard to the facts in Judd 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990), because the trial had 
occurred prior to the reversal in Stoker. By so doing, the Van Dyke Court explained that, 
"[i]n effect, we said that the Stoker decision should be applied prospectively only." 818 
P.2d at 1025. In its examination of that prospective effect limitation, the Van Dyke Court 
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acknowledged that the imposition of a prospective relief limitation required a change in 
the law, "justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law/5 and a showing of "whether 
some other undue burden would result from retroactive application of [the new law]." Id. 
Although there had been a change in the law, the Court held that there could not be 
justifiable reliance on a requirement which existed for fewer than ten years. It also 
rejected the argument that the change in law created an "undue burden" by "increasing] 
the burden of defending" against a boundary-by-acquiescence claim. Id. at 1025-1026. 
The Court held that "[i]f such an approach were followed, any decision that modified in 
any way a previously articulated legal standard would have to be prospective only, 
making prospective application the rule rather than the exception." Id. at 1026. 
Concluding that the Court had "not examine[d] carefully the basis for that decision," it 
did not hesitate to reverse the prospective effect limitation. Id. at 1025. 
This is the same standard articulated by the Court in Munson v. Chamberlain. 
However, the Commission claims that Munson does not apply because "the parties and 
several amici presented adversarial briefs on the issue of retroactivity and prospectivity at 
both the initial stage and on rehearing." Commission's Brief, p. 26. The emergence of 
this issue in the late stages of the appeals process is a far cry from the circumstances 
favored by the Munson Court, to wit, "actual[] litigat[ion of the issues] in the lower 
courts." Id. (emphasis added). The Commission claims that the filing of a motion for 
rehearing by amici oil and gas producers (and not ExxonMobil) demonstrates the 
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adequacy of this Court's consideration of the prospective relief issue. Munson supports 
reversal of the prospective relief limitation because (1) the issue was never "litigated in 
the lower courts," id.; (2) ExxonMobil was not a participant in the motion for 
reconsideration; (3) there was never a hearing on that motion; and (4) there is no evidence 
that the denial of the motion was based on the merits, particularly inasmuch as the 
Commission's opposition to the motion was based entirely on its claim that the amici 
parties did not have standing to make such a motion. 
The ExxonMobil Court's failure to carefully examine the basis for its decision 
denying retroactive relief is illustrated by the Court's imposition of the limitation even 
though the ExxonMobil decision did not create new law; the undue weight given to the 
concerns expressed by Amici Funds which had no support in the record before the 
ExxonMobil Court and are disproved by the record in this appeal; and the concerns 
articulated by ExxonMobil if this precedent is not reversed which concerns have not been 
disputed by the Commission or the Amici Funds. If the Court does not reverse the 
prospective relief limitation, then, when the Court reverses an agency's persistent 
misinterpretation of statutory provisions, prospective application may become "the rule 
rather than the exception." Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1026. 
B. Under Well-Established Utah Law, a Prospective Relief Limitation Is 
Only Appropriate When a Decision Establishes New Law, 
In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil explained that the threshold requirement which 
must be met before the Court can impose a prospective relief limitation is that the 
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decision must have established "new law." Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
The Amici Funds agree that prospective effect limitations can only been imposed in 
"decisions invalidating or changing the interpretation of a statute." Amici Funds' Brief, 
p. 7. In its Response Brief, the Commission admitted that the ExxonMobil Court "merely 
interpreted a statute and did not establish 'new law."' Commission's Brief, pp. 23-24 
(emphasis added). Inasmuch as the ExxonMobil Court did not invalidate or change the 
interpretation of a statute, it did not establish "new law." Therefore, if this Court follows 
established precedent requiring the establishment of "new law" before a prospective relief 
limitation can be imposed, then it should reverse the prospective relief limitation in the 
ExxonMobil case. 
The Commission was apparently comfortable conceding that ExxonMobil "did not 
establish 'new law'" because it believes that the Chevron Oil standard is not utilized by 
this Court; and that this Court has imposed a prospective relief limitation in other cases 
prior to ExxonMobil where the Court's decision did not result in new law. The 
Commission's attempt to characterize this Court's decisions imposing prospective relief 
limitations as not adhering to the "new law" requirement of Chevron Oil appears to be 
based on the Commission's erroneous claim that "Chevron was not cited or analyzed by 
the Court in any of the cases decided subsequent to Andrews...." 
This Court's adherence to the Chevron Oil standard was clearly demonstrated in 
Kennecott, wherein this Court stated that it "reached the same conclusion" as the 
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Colorado Supreme Court, and quoted the Colorado court's statement that, in matters of 
state law, "'we continue to adhere to the Chevron . . . analysis in resolving the issue of 
retroactive or prospective application of the state judicial decision.'" Kennecott, 862 P.2d 
at 1352, n. 23, quoting Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 112 n. 7 (Colo. 
1992). Regardless of whether the Court cited Chevron Oil in each of its decisions, until 
ExxonMobil, the Court has consistently followed the Chevron Oil test when it has given 
its decision prospective effect. 
In every case cited by ExxonMobil, the Commission, and the Amici Funds, where 
this Court imposed a prospective relief limitation, it did so because "new law" was 
created by its decision. In most cases, new law was created when the Court held a statute 
unconstitutional. V-l Oil, 942 P.2d 906 (statute held unconstitutional); Timpanogos 
Planning and Water Management v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Utah, 690 
P.2d 562 (1984)(statute allowing district court to appoint board of directors of water 
conservancy districts held unconstitutional); RioAlgom Corp., 681 P.2d 184 (taxing 
statute held unconstitutional). In the other cited cases, new law was created when well-
established precedent was overturned, Loyal Order of Moose # 259 v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982)(Court gave prospective effect to its 
correction of "an interpretation of law that has been relied on [since 1911]."), or when the 
Court created law because there was not a law in effect with respect to the issue before 
the Court. Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah 
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1983)("Utah statutes do not address the subject of interest on school funds"). ExxonMobil 
is the sole exception to this practice.5 
The Commission's claim that "prospective application of a rule is not restricted to 
instances where 'new law' is established" is based entirely on its interpretation of Board 
of Education v. Salt Lake County. Brief of Respondent, p. 23. However, the 
Commission's reliance on that case is misplaced. The Board of Education of the Granite 
School District sued the county and its treasurer for damages based on the treasurer's 
failure to timely remit to Granite its share of property taxes. The Court held that the 
treasurer had failed to comply with mandatory statutory provisions regarding disbursal of 
funds to Granite. It also observed that the treasurer's "practice of delaying payment of 
taxes to the various entities is one of long-standing," and that "no one has heretofore 
challenged that practice in the courts." Board of Education, 659 P.2d at 1037. The Board 
sought damages in the form of interest, but the Court found that "Utah statutes do not 
5
 In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil also cited to several decisions from other 
jurisdictions wherein the courts refused to limit the retroactive application of its decision 
because the decisions were matters of statutory interpretation and, thus, "did not establish 
a new principle of law." Broyles v. Ft Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Colo. 
1985); Clark v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 
2003)(decision "involving] the interpretation of a statute . . . did not establish a new 
principle of law . . . [and] must be applied retroactively"); Sodexho Marriott Mgmt. v. 
United States, 61 Fed. CI. 229, 238 (Fed. CI. 2004)(decision interpreting statute did not 
establish new principle of law and should be given full retroactive effect). Rather than 
present competing case law, the Commission simply alleges that "federal precedent is not 
binding." However, these cases demonstrate that a decision which merely interprets a 
statute, as the Commission admits occurred in the ExxonMobil case, should be given full 
retroactive effect. 
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address the subject of interest on school funds." Id. at 1036. Therefore it relied on a 
"well established rule allowing interest on overdue debts" to conclude, for the first time, 
that a governmental entity would be liable for damages when it delayed remitting property 
taxes to various entities. Clearly this case involved the establishment of new law 
inasmuch as this practice had never been challenged and Utah statutes did not address the 
damage issue. 
This Court has long recognized that, in matters of statutory interpretation, "the 
ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and 
prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 1984). The Commission 
concedes that the ExxonMobil Court "merely interpreted a statute and did not establish 
'new law/" Commission's Brief, pp. 23-24 (emphasis added). The Amici Funds agree 
that prospective effect limitations are only appropriate when "new law" is created. Amici 
Funds' Brief, pp. 7-10. Because the interpretation of a statute did not establish "new 
law," the ExxonMobil Court should have given full retroactive effect to its interpretation 
of the severance tax statutes. 
C. The ExxonMobil Court's Failure to Carefully Examine the Basis for its 
Prospective Relief Limitation Is Demonstrated by the Undue Weight 
Given to the Alleged Burden on "Amici Revitalization Funds and Other 
Small Governmental Entities." 
When a Court establishes "new law," it may give prospective effect to its decision 
when it concludes that there has been "justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law," 
and that an "undue burden would result from retroactive application of [the new law]." 
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Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1025.6 Because this analysis is only relevant "when a judicial 
decision decisively changes the common law," this Court need not reach this issue if it 
concludes that ExxonMobil did not establish new law. Id. 
The ExxonMobil Court did not suggest that there had been "justifiable reliance on 
the prior state of the law." Indeed, "justifiable reliance" was an impossibility because the 
Commission could not "justifiably" rely on what this Court concluded was a 
misinterpretation of severance tax provisions. Furthermore, the Commission has not 
disputed the fact that all available precedent supported ExxonMobil's interpretation of 
severance tax provisions. See Opening Brief, p. 36. Finally, inasmuch as the 
Commission has admitted that the "Court merely interpreted a statute and did not 
establish 'new law,5" the Commission cannot claim to have relied on a "prior state of the 
law." 
Because justifiable reliance was not asserted and is an impossibility, the only basis 
on which the Court based its imposition of the prospective relief limitation was its 
concern "that retroactive application could result in large refunds of taxes already 
collected and spent by governmental entities." ExxonMobil, f^ 23. ExxonMobil has 
6
 The Commission misstates the standard as examining "the extent of reliance on 
previous state law and the burden that would be imposed by retroactive application." 
Commission's Brief, p. 22. Although the Commission cites Van Dyke in support of that 
characterization, the Van Dyke Court clearly acknowledged the threshold requirement that 
new law be created, as well as the need for "justifiable reliance" and the showing of an 
"undue burden" resulting from the retroactive application of the new law. 818 P.2d at 
1025. 
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explained that the facts in the record conclusively demonstrate that the Court's concern 
for the Amici Funds was misplaced because (1) there is no evidence that the Amici Funds 
are impacted by refund requests; (2) other "small governmental entities" are not 
implicated by refund requests; (3) the Amici Funds are not impacted by severance tax 
from wells which are not located on Indian lands; and (4) the Amici Funds have no legal 
right to a revenue windfall resulting from post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments which 
enforce the Commission's misinterpretation of severance tax laws. Opening Brief, pp. 
43-45. 
The Commission's response to the evidence that the ExxonMobil Court gave 
inordinate weight to alleged potential impact on the Amici Funds was confined to the 
following four statements: 
1. "[T]he judicial policy of the Court to apply a decision prospectively only 
depends on burdens that may be disruptive and does not require the Court to 
show that there will be an actual burden." Commission's Brief, p. 24. 
2. "[NJothing in the record indicates that the selective prospectivity applied in 
this case is not functioning precisely as the Court intended." Id., p. 25 
3. "[T]he Court clearly supported its decision by citing to prior case law and 
by enunciating the judicial policy it sought to achieve by applying selective 
prospectivity." Id., p. 26. 
4. "The Petitioners' bare assertions-that amici and State government would 
not be burdened if full retroactivity were applied is belied by the number 
and dollar amounts of the claims it brings in this appeal. 
These statements do not adequately refiite the evidence provided by ExxonMobil that the 
Court gave undue weight to concerns expressed by the Amici Funds. 
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The Commission's minimizing of the standard as only requiring a showing that 
burdens "may be disruptive" is clearly at odds with the standard applied by this Court in 
prior cases. See Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 195 (State decisions imposing prospective 
limitations "rely on . . . the great financial and administrative hardship that would be 
entailed if general retroactive effect were allowed."). By suggesting that judicial policy 
"does not require the Court to show that there will be an actual burden," the Commission 
attempts to bar the door to post-ExxonMobil evidence which demonstrates that the 
Court's assumptions were wrong. Such evidence is crucial to a Court's ability to 
determine whether a rule ought to continue in force: 
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is that a 
court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the rule 
of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced 
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399, quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial 
Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957). 
The Commission's allegation that the selective prospectivity is functioning as 
intended is meaningless. Certainly the prospective effect limitation has successfully 
prevented taxpayers from challenging deficiency assessments and pursuing refund claims. 
That does not mean that the Court was correct in imposing that limitation. 
The Commission's statement that the Court "enunciated] the judicial policy it 
sought to achieve" is likewise unavailing. The mere enunciation of judicial policy does 
24 
not imbue it with validity. Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 445, 471 
(1948)(Black, J., dissenting)("When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument 
that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to 
destroy it."), quoted in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. ExxonMobil has demonstrated 
that the enunciated judicial policy was based on misrepresentations and unfounded 
assumptions and the Commission has provided no rebuttal. 
Finally, the Commission claims that the necessity of the prospective effect 
limitation is demonstrated "by the number and dollar amounts of the claims 
[ExxonMobil] brings in this appeal." The refund requests by ExxonMobil, excluding 
interest, total just over $1.6 million. It is essential to keep in mind that ExxonMobil is 
entitled to these refunds under the correct interpretation of severance tax laws. The 
only reason ExxonMobil has been denied these additional refunds is because the 
Commission has refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision retroactively. ExxonMobil's 
entitlement to relief is not dependent on the amount of the refund. Furthermore, all 
available evidence establishes that any refund to ExxonMobil will be issued out of the 
State's General Fund. A refund in the amount requested by ExxonMobil is a minuscule 
fraction of the General Fund.7 
7
 The revenues deposited into the General Fund in fiscal year 2008 were 
approximately $1,995 billion dollars. Utah State Tax Commission Annual Report 2008 
Fiscal Year, p. 12. Thus, the requested refund of $1.6 million dollars would constitute 
about .000802 of the fund. 
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If the Commission truly believes that the validity of the prospective relief 
limitation can be established by the number and dollar amount of refund requests, then 
evidence of the number and dollar amount of deficiency assessments issued against 
taxpayers which have paid their severance taxes in accordance with the law as determined 
by the ExxonMobil Court would conclusively establish the error in the Court's decision. 
Those deficiency assessments issued to taxpayers who correctly paid their severance 
taxes and whose wells are not on Indian lands total more than $4 million. See n. 9, 
infra. 
D. The Amici Funds Have Not Demonstrated the Validity of the 
ExxonMobil Court's Concerns for the Potential Burden Resulting 
from Retroactive Application of the Court's Decision, 
Once again, it is important to note, that the alleged burden on the Amici Funds is 
only relevant if this Court concludes that the ExxonMobil decision established new law. 
According to the Amici Funds, the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Court were 
valid and any facts subsequent to the Court's decision are not relevant in determining 
whether the Court's assumptions were correct. In Munson, this Court held that it is 
appropriate to consider such facts because a prior decision should be overruled'" when 
conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision wholly inapplicable.'" 2007 
UT 91 If 21, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n. 3. According to the Amici 
Funds, reversal of the prospective relief limitation will "(1) provide an unexpected 
windfall for oil and gas producers; (2) result in a very troublesome revenue drain to the 
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State at a time of strained budgets and finances; and (3) create an impossible situation for 
the Amici, since severance tax revenue distributed to them has been expended and is not 
available to be refunded." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 10. 
ExxonMobil believes that this Court's review of the proceedings before the 
Commission should be "'limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" 
State of Utah v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279, quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. 
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985). Well-established facts demonstrate that the 
concerns raised by the Amici Funds are either erroneous or insufficient to justify 
continued enforcement of the prospective effect limitation. 
1. Reversal of the prospective effect limitation would not provide a 
"windfall to oil and gas producers," but would return tax monies 
to the taxpayers to which they are legally entitled. 
The Amici Funds claim that reversal of the prospective effect limitation will 
"provide an unexpected windfall for oil and gas producers." Id., p. 10.8 The Amici 
Fund's characterization of a legitimate refund as a "windfall" ignores the fact that this 
Court concluded that valuation of the oil and gas should have occurred "in the immediate 
vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." 
ExxonMobil, % 24. The Commission's persistent misinterpretation of severance tax 
8
 The Amici Funds claim that, under James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 
501 U.S. 529 (1991), a court may decline to give retroactive effect to its decision when 
"persons other than the litigants might receive a windfall." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 8. 
This was not a consideration discussed in the Beam decision. Retroactivity presumes that 
the parties to whom a decision may retroactively apply are entitled to the relief afforded 
by retroactive application of that decision. 
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provisions resulted in a substantial windfall to the state coffers and to the Amici Funds. 
ExxonMobil is simply trying to obtain a refund of taxes it should never have been 
required to pay. To suggest that the refund of illegally collected taxes would result in a 
"windfall" to the taxpayer assumes that the taxpayer is not entitled to the money it seeks 
and blatantly mischaracterizes the potential outcome of this case. Tucson Elec. Power 
Co. v. Apache Co., 185 Ariz. 5, 20, 912 P.2d 9, 24 (Ariz. App. 1995)("[W]e find it 
difficult to conceive how requiring the state and the affected counties to refund the 
proceeds of an illegal tax to those who paid it under protest could be viewed as 
'substantially inequitable.5"). 
2. The alleged potential drain on state resources is overstated and 
provides no basis to uphold the prospective relief limitation if 
this Court concludes it erred. 
The Amici Funds claim that the prospective relief limitation was appropriate 
because retroactive application had "the potential of opening the door to refund claims by 
dozens of oil and gas producers." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 11. The Amici Funds claim 
that the threat of multiple claims remains because "[t]here were and are many other 
potential refund claimants, large and small, waiting in the wings." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 
12. The Amici Funds have not provided any evidence that such a threat exits. According 
to the record before this Court, ExxonMobil is the only pending refund case. There are 
three other severance tax cases, but those are challenges to deficiency assessments by 
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operators whose wells are not on Indian lands.9 Thus there would be no impact on the 
Amici Funds. 
In the legislative session immediately following the issuance of the ExxonMobil 
decision, the Legislature amended the severance tax statutes to specifically require that 
transportation costs be deducted from the value of oil and gas at the well. Consequently, 
there are no refund claims for taxes collected after January 1, 2004. Because there is a 
six-year statute of limitations on severance tax matters, any potential refund claims for 
years earlier than 2003 are now barred. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-114(2)(a). The only 
potential refund claims that could be requested at this time regarding the subject issue 
would be for the overpayment of severance taxes in 2003. There is simply no evidence in 
the record that there are any other entities who are seeking a refund claim on this issue for 
9
 This Court may take judicial notice of the deficiency assessment cases pending 
before it and other state courts and agencies. Deficiency assessments against Union Oil 
Company of California ("Unocal") issued prior to ExxonMobil total $1,394,166.19, plus 
interest. Union Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % Case No. 20080068-SC, Opening 
Brief, Addendum p. 0015 f^ 72. The deficiency assessments issued against Unocal after 
the ExxonMobil decision total $795,311.99, plus interest. Id., Addendum pp. 0017-0018 
•J 87. See Addendum 1 attached hereto. Deficiency assessments against River Gas 
Corporation for tax years 1994-98 total approximately $376,583.56, plus interest. River 
Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist. Ct). See 
Addendum 2 attached hereto. Deficiency assessments issued after ExxonMobil against 
the same River Gas wells (now titled in the name of ConocoPhillips) for tax years 1999-
2003 total approximately $1,518,557.80, plus interest. ConocoPhillips v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm 9n, Tax Comm'n Appeal No. 04-0316. See 
Addendum 3 attached hereto. None of the wells involved in these deficiency cases are 
located on Indian lands. 
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the 2003 tax year. However, even if such claims exist, that fact would not outweigh the 
rights of taxpayers to obtain refunds of their severance tax overpayments. 
The Amici's argument also ignores the fact that many of the "potential claimants" 
to which it refers have challenged deficiency assessments. Because this Court held that 
ExxonMobil could not be applied to deficiency proceedings before the Commission, the 
Division began issuing deficiency assessments against taxpayers which had correctly 
calculated their severance tax liability.10 By issuing deficiency assessment, the Division 
has attempted to collect millions of dollars in severance tax payments based on a statutory 
interpretation which was rejected by this Court. The Amici Funds warn that allowing 
such challenges to proceed will "chang[e] the settled expectations of all parties." Amici 
Funds' Brief, p. 12. They also warn that "[a]ny reduction in severance tax collections . . . 
would cause havoc." Id. The State and the Amici Funds do not have a legitimate 
expectation in deficiency assessments which are based on a statutory interpretation which 
has been rejected by this Court. The Division's issuance of such assessments against 
severance taxpayers which had paid their severance taxes under the correct interpretation 
of the law was likely not anticipated by the ExxonMobil Court. If the Court does not 
reverse the prospective relief limitation, then the State's General Fund and the Amici 
Funds will receive a windfall at taxpayer expense. 
10
 In its appeal, Unocal argued that the prospective relief limitation only applied to 
"deficiency proceedings [which were] pending before the Tax Commission" when the 
ExxonMobil decision was issued. ExxonMobil, H 24. This Court has not yet ruled on the 
Unocal appeal. 
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3. All available evidence suggests that the ExxonMobil Court's 
concern for the financial impact on the Amici Funds was 
unfounded. 
In their 2003 amicus brief, the Amici Funds alleged that they would be irreparably 
harmed if the Court's interpretation of severance tax law required them to issue severance 
tax refunds. The Court acknowledged that "the foil breadth and depth of the impact is not 
immediately apparent from the record," but assumed, based on representations made by 
the Amici Funds, that refunds "would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization 
funds and other relatively small governmental entities." ExxonMobil, ^ 23.11 Facts 
subsequent to that decision are essential to demonstrate that the Court's unprecedented 
decision to deny the retroactive application of its statutory interpretation was based on a 
critical erroneous assumption-that the Amici Funds would be required to issue "[l]arge 
refunds of money already collected and spent." Id. 
In reality, the Amici Funds were not affected by the refund permitted in that case 
because the refund was issued out of the State's General Fund. Opening Brief, p. 44. 
Neither the Commission nor the Amici Funds have denied this fact. Evidence produced 
11
 The Amici Funds suggest that the "other small governmental entities" referred 
to by the ExxonMobil Court included the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, which receives 
funding from conservation fees which are calculated based on severance taxes. These 
fees were not at issue in either ExxonMobil or Unocal Under Utah Code section 40-6-
14.5(6), those fees are deposited into a restricted account. Once the account reaches 
$750,000, the excess funds are deposited in the State's General Fund. There has never 
been any evidence before this Court to suggest that the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining 
would be negatively impacted by retroactive application of ExxonMobil The alleged, 
unsubstantiated threat to that division does not outweigh the taxpayer's right to retain its 
own money and not be illegally and excessively taxed. 
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by the Auditing Division and attached in the addendum to Petitioner's Opening Brief in 
Union Oil Co. of California v. Utah State Tax Comm% Case No. 20080068-SC, 
contained the Division's admission that the refunds to ExxonMobil were issued from the 
State's General Fund and that the State did not seek reimbursement from the Amici Funds 
for those refunds. See reference to that evidence at Opening Brief, Addendum 4, p. 33, 
n. 4 (evidence referenced in that footnote attached hereto as Addendum 4). 
In all of the proceedings before this Court, neither the Commission nor the Amici 
Funds have presented any evidence that the State's General Fund is legally authorized to 
ask the Amici Funds to return any severance tax monies previously appropriated to the 
Amici Funds. Inasmuch as all evidence of record suggests that a refund to ExxonMobil 
would be generated from the State's General Fund, the Amici Funds' claim that they will 
be financially devastated if the prospective effect limitation is reversed should be 
disregarded. Pliego, 1999 UT at % 7, 974 P.2d at 280, (court's review is '"limited to the 
evidence contained in the record on appeal.'"). 
The Amici Funds also allege that the revitalization funds were established with an 
expectation of a certain level of funding based on the statutory formula. Amici Funds' 
Brief, pp. 5-6. According to the Amici Funds, the reduction in revenue resulting from the 
ExxonMobil Court's interpretation of severance tax provisions had (and continues to 
have) the potential to cause 'the Indian people [to] consider[] this as another example of 
having been given promises which were not fulfilled"; cause the Utes to "implement their 
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proposed, economically damaging Business Activity Fee"; and result in "[t]he Navajos 
taking the position that they are no longer bound by negotiated concessions that they 
made." Amici Funds9 Brief, p. 6. These allegations provide no basis for the Court to 
uphold the prospective relief limitation. Those "expectations," if they existed, would 
have been based on a misinterpretation of law. Furthermore, there is no threat that the 
concerns expressed by the Amici Funds will "be realized in the future should the revenues 
derived by the Amici Funds be insufficient" because the ExxonMobil Court's 
interpretation of the severance tax laws is the interpretation which has been in effect since 
the decision was issued. 
The ExxonMobil decision did not change that statutory formula, but simply 
provided the correct interpretation of the statute. Malan, 693 P.2d at 676. Thus any 
expectation by the Amici Funds that the beneficiaries of the funds would receive 
severance tax amounts in excess of what the law allowed does not provide a legitimate 
basis for this Court to refuse retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision. 
E. Imposing a Prospective Relief Limitation When New Law Has Not 
Been Created Usurps Legislative Authority and Leads to Agency 
Abuse, 
Because the ExxonMobil Court imposed a prospective relief limitation in a matter 
of statutory interpretation, precedent has been established with potentially far-reaching 
ramifications which neither the Commission nor the Amici Funds acknowledge or 
address. 
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This Court has always refused to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute. 
Bennion v. Graham Resources, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993)("[W]e review the Board's 
interpretation of the applicable statutes for correctness and give its view on the matter no 
particular deference.55). Yet, because this Court refused to give retroactive effect to its 
correction of the agency's misinterpretation of severance tax laws, an agency has been 
empowered to enforce its misinterpretation of severance tax laws, despite this Court's 
unambiguous declaration that "[vjaluation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the 
well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, f 24. 
Subsequent to the ExxonMobil decision, the Division issued deficiency 
assessments totaling millions of dollars against taxpayers who had paid their severance 
taxes based on value of the oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well." Id. 
However, because this Court refused to give retroactive effect to its decision, the Division 
concluded that it could issue those assessments for time periods preceding the decision 
and that the taxpayer would be powerless to defend against the assessments. Indeed, the 
Commission has enforced the assessments based on this Court's refusal to give 
retroactive effect to the ExxonMobil decision. 
If the Court upholds the prospective relief limitation, then, as ExxonMobil warned 
in its Opening Brief, taxing entities will have virtual immunity in refund actions and 
deficiency proceedings. A taxing entity could interpret taxing provisions in a manner 
which allows it to collect taxes to which it is not legally entitled. Until a judicial 
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interpretation of the misapplied taxing provision is rendered, the taxing entity could 
continue to enforce its misinterpretation. The longer the taxing entity has persisted in its 
misapplication of the statute, the greater its alleged financial interest will be. Under 
ExxonMobil, that financial interest would provide an adequate basis for imposing a 
prospective relief limitation which deprives all taxpayers, except the first one to the 
courthouse, of relief to which they would otherwise be entitled under Utah law. As this 
Court so eloquently stated in Van Dyke, such an approach would make "prospective 
application the rule rather than the exception." Id. at 1026. 
CONCLUSION 
ExxonMobil respectfully requests this Court to interpret the ExxonMobil decision 
in accordance with its plain language and direct the Commission to issue the refunds 
requested by Petitioners. Alternatively, ExxonMobil requests this Court to recognize that 
it "did not examine carefully" the basis for the prospective relief limitation and conclude 
that the ExxonMobil Court's prospective effect limitation was erroneous. Van Dyke, 818 
P.2d 1025. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2009. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
David J. Crapo 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
35 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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River Gas (aka "ConocoPhillips") (1999-2003) and copies 
of Petitions for Redetermination to the Utah State Tax 
Commission therefore 0011-0019 
Supplemental Answers to Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admissions, River Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist. Ct, Dec. 7, 2006) 0020-0030 
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1994, 1995, 1996 & 1997 
04-1283 
Conservation Fee 
1998 & 1999 
04-1284 
Severance Tax 
1998 & 1999 
Chapman 
Presiding: Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner 
D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli, Commissioner 
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: For Petitioner: Mr. David J. Crapo, Attorney at Law 
Ms. Renee Crosby 
Mr. Russ Wimberley 
Mr. Jason Thakker 
Ms. Inge-Lise Goss, from Auditing Division 
For Respondent: Mr. Clark L. Snelson, Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Laron Lind, Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Inge-Lise Goss, from Auditing Division 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter pertains to a consolidated appeal of three separate Statutory Notices issued to 
Union Oil Company of California ("Unocal") by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Division"). On March 27, 28, and 29, 2007, the Tax Commission conducted a Formal 
Hearing for the consolidated appeals. On May 14, 2007, each of the parties submitted a post-hearing 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. 
OOUU-iO 
Appeal Nos. 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
71. On March 22, 2000, the Division sent a Preliminary Notice - Severance Tax to 
Unocal containing an Audit Summary. In the "Explanation of Audit Findings" contained in the Audit 
Summary,the Division stated that: 1) Unocal sold their oil production under arm's-length contracts at the 
well or from the unit; 2) the gross value received under those arm's-length contracts is the appropriate 
value for severance tax; and 3) residue gas and NGLs are sold at the plant tailgate.40 
72. On December 8, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice - Severance Tax 
for the period January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1997, in which it asserted a severance tax deficiency 
in the total amount of $1,082,951.70, plus interest computed to January 7, 2001 in the amount of 
$311,214.49, for a total deficiency of $1,394,166.19. In the explanation of audit findings, the Division 
stated that "[information from Unocal's original and amended severance tax returns were used to 
compute the tax liability for the audit period."4l 
73. At the Formal Hearing, Ms. Goss testified that the Division had used contract 
prices from sales of the oil and gas at the tailgate of the plant as the basis to value Unocal's oil and gas. 
74. Ms. Goss testified that the Division used the net-back method to calculate the 
value of the NGLs, but only allowed a processing cost deduction of two-thirds (66 2/3%) of the value of 
the NGLs. Ms. Goss claimed that this was the only deduction the Division allowed regarding Unocal's 
processing costs at the Lisbon Plant. 
75. In its Statutory Notice, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the 
oil, gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.04 for tax year 1994, $43,750.00 for 
tax year 1995, $42,205.85 for tax year 1996, and $39,494.31 for tax year 1997.42 
Unocal's Exhibit 11. 
Unocal's Exhibit 13. 
Unocal's Exhibit 13, Schedule 1, pp. 1-3 & Schedule 4, p. L 
-
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Appeal Nos. 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
83. There is no evidence that prior to issuing the May 3, 2004 Preliminary Notice, 
the Division issued a letter or other notice informing Unocal that it would conduct an audit of Unocal in 
regards to Utah's severance tax for the Second Audit Period. 
84. By letter dated June 8, 2004, Unocal informed the Division that it had filed 
quarterly severance tax returns for 1998 and attached copies of those returns. Unocal also informed the 
Division that it had ceased making additional severance tax payments beginning with the second quarter 
of 1998 "due to the fact that [Unocal's] calculations showed no tax due when value is calculated on a net 
back basis or that any amount due was offset by refunds due Unocal from the State."45 
85. The Division contends that on July 8, 2004, it issued Statutory Notices of 
deficiency for severance taxes and conservation fees due for the period January 1, 1998 through 
December 31, 1999, the Second Audit Period. The notices were mailed to Unocal's successor in the 
Lisbon Unit, Tom Brown, Inc., the entity that purchased Unocal's interest in the Lisbon Unit effective 
July 1, 1999. The assessments were not appealed within thirty days of their July 8, 2004 issuance date. 
86. On October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Conservation Fee 
to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $35,315.53, plus interest computed to November 
4, 2004 in the amount of $12,394.19, for a total amount due of $47,709.72.46 Unocal appealed the 
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 04-
1283. 
87. Also on October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Oil and Gas 
Severance Tax to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $591,530.67 of additional tax, 
plus interest computed to November 4, 2004 in the amount of $173,041.26. The Division also assessed a 
10% penalty for failure to file a 1998 annual severance tax return, which totaled $30,740.06. The total 
45
 Unocal's Exhibit 15. 
46
 Unocal's Exhibit 14. 
-
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Appeal Nos. 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
severance tax deficiency assessed for the Second Audit Period was $795,311.99.47 Unocal appealed the 
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 04-
1284. 
88. In the Statutory Notices, the Division valued Unocal's gas and NGLs by relying 
on its contract sales price for the products at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant.48 The Division used the 
contract sales prices as the starting point for valuing NGLs, but applied a 70% processing cost allowance 
to the value of the NGLs, thereby employing a net-back method. The Division did not deduct processing 
or transportation costs from the contract prices of the residue gas. 
89. The Division valued the oil by using posted prices for sweet oil at the Giant's 
Paradox Basin. 
90. The Commission finds that there is no dispute between the parties that the sour 
oil produced from the Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced by the Giant's 
Paradox Basin until the sour oil had been processed at the Lisbon Plant. 
91. For tax year 1998, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil, 
gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.05.50 
92. For tax year 1999, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil, 
gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $21,875.03.51 According to the Division, the 
available exemption was reduced by 50% because Unocal was the operator only through June 30, 1999; 
i.e., one-half of the year. 
Id. 
Id, Schedules 2-4. 
Id 
Id, Schedule 2, p. 1. 










UTAH SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
RIVER GAS CORPORATION 
FOR THE PERIOD 
01/01/1994-13/31/1998 
River Gas Corporation 
511 Energy Center 8lvd-
Northport,AL 35476 
Report Date: 8/25/2000 
Account Number: N1600 & N1605 
Field Name: Drunkard Wash 









*Note: Interest Computed To: 











The following summarizes the severance tax adjustments. 
2. RGC also underreported product value. The company deducted separator repairs, compressor rentals, electric power compression, 
and compression station expenses. These are not allowable deductions. Gas transportation costs were allowed. 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Mark K.Buchi #0475 
Steven P. Young #7681 
299 South Main Street, Suite #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
RIVER GAS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR REVEEW BY TRIAL 
DE NOVO OF UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION DECISION and 
REQUEST FOR A TAX JUDGE 
Case No. f ^ f f l r t f t o ? . 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601, 59-l-602(l)(c), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff River Gas Corporation hereby petitions the District Court for 
review by trial de novo of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision dated 
October 6,2005, of the Utah State Tax Commission in River Gas Corp. v. Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission (Tax Commission Appeal No. 00-1159), attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-505(1), Plaintiff has posted an Appeal Bond with 
the Utah State Tax Commission for the full amount of the taxes, interest, and penalties at issue in 
this matter. A copy of the Appeal Bond is attached to this Petition as Exhibit B. 
#189715 vl 
Pursuant to Rule 6-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiff requests 
that this case be assigned to a tax judge. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2005. 
HOLME ROBERTS^ OWEN LLP 
lark EL Buck 
Steven P. Young 
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RIVER GAS CORP., ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
Petitioner, ) AND FINAL DECISION 
) 
v. ) Appeal No. 00-1159 
) Parcel No. N1605 
AUDITING DIVISION OF ) 
THE UTAH STATE TAX ) Tax Type: Severance Tax 
COMMISSION, ) Tax Period: 01/01/94 thru 12/31/98 
) 
Respondent ) Judge: Davis 
Presiding: 
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
Palmer DePaulis, Commissioner 
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mr. Mark Buchi, from the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen 
Mr. Steve Young, from the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen 
For Respondent: Mr. Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division 
Ms. Shelly Robinson, from the Auditing Division 
Ms. Ingelise Goss, from the Auditing Division 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
November 29,2004. After that full day, the hearing was continued until March 22,2005. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the parties requested permission to file briefe, together with proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. The last of those documents was received 
on June 14, 2005. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing and the 
arguments thereon, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
AppealNo. 00-1159 
28. On August25,2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice for 1he period January 
1,1994throughDecember31,1998 in the amount of $376,583.56, plus interest of $69,408.09/ The 
Statutory Notice allowed RGCs deduction of the QPC transportation costs, but disallowed RGCs 
deduction for the costs of compression. 
29. RGC filed a timely appeal to the Utah State Tax Commission which was assigned 
Appeal No. 00-1159. 
30. OnJune 1,2001, the Tax Commission issued a Scheduling OrdCT set in [sic] the 
case for hearing on October 2,2001. It was discovered that the Commission inadvertently set the 
hearing for one hour rather than afull day so the hearing was continued until January 2002. Upon 
motion, this case was stayed by the Tax Commission pending a decision in an appeal filed by 
ExxonMobil. 
31. OnDecember 18,2001, the Tax Commission held a hearing in ExxonMobil on a 
bifurcated factual and legal issue. 
32. That decision was eventually appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which issued 
an Opinion No. 20021023 dated November 25,2003. 
33. That Opinion stated at ^24 "Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further 
adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply 
prospectively only." 
1 Interest continues to accrue at the statutory rate. 
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Account Number. N16G$ 
Shantfra Winters 
Jaterisst* Total Amount Due I 
*14M72^& $7B&S0&46 
| 
EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS; 
The following summaries Ifte severance tax ^djustrrjsnis 
$272;(»1,89for^k3l 
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AMENDED 
UTAH OIL & GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
FOR THE PERIOD 
01/01/2001 -12/31/2001 
Phillips Petroleum Company 
960 Plaza Office Bldg 
Bartlesville, OK 74004 
Report Date: 3/12/2004 




J Exhibit A 
*Note: Interest Computed To: 









Total Amount Due 
$481,125.73 
EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS: 
The following summarizes the severance tax adjustments. 
1. Phillips Petroleum Company underreported product value. The company deducted electric power compression 
and compression station expenses. These are not allowable deductions. Phillips was given allowable transportation costs. 
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UTAH OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
FOR THE PERIOD 
01/01/2002-12/31/2002 
Phillips Petroleum Company 
1110 Plaza Office Bidg. 
Bartfesville, OK 74004 
Report Date: 4/22/2008 





Payment made on 03/26/2008 
Payment made on 04/09/2008 
I Balance Due/(Credit) 
I *Note: Interest Computed To: 






















The following summarizes the oil and gas severance tax audit adjustments. 
1. Phillips Petroleum Company (Phillips) deducted gathering costs from product value for entity number 11256 that were 
not allowable transportation deductions for the 2002 tax year. 
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AMENDED 
UTAH OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY 
FOR THE PERIOD 
01/01/2003 -12/31/2005 
ConocoPhillips Company 
1090 Plaza Office Bldg 
Bartlesville, OK 74004 
Report Date: 4/12/2007 
Account Number: N2335 
Examining Officer 
Randy M. Thackeray 
Reference 
Exhibit A 
Payment made on 03/05/2007 
Total 
Interest from 03/05/07 to 04/27/07 
Total Balance Due 
Additional Tax 
L_ 
*Note: Interest Computed To: 
Daily Interest Amount 
05/12/07 
$40.90 





















EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS: 
The following summarizes the oil and gas severance tax audit adjustments. 
1. ConocoPhillips Company (ConocoPhillips) deducted transportation costs from product value for entity number 11256 that were 
not allowable for the 2003 tax year. 
A A 4 A 
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Before The Utah State Tax Commission 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION Go 
Petitioner (print or type) j 
River Gas Corooration 
D.B.A. 
Mailing address 1090 Plaza Office Building 
Bartiesville, OK 74004 
Daytime telephone no. 
918-661-3509 
Account/FEIN/Social Security no. 
N1605 
FAX telephone no. 
918-661-4057 
Property Parcel number 
Tax Type and Primary Issue 
Petitioner representative, if any (print or type) 
Name 
Mark Buchi or Steve Young 
F , r m
 Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
Mailing address 299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Daytime telephone no. | 801-521-5800 FAX telephone no. 801-521-9639 
I authorize the above-named person to discuss r—i r-j 
this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission. L J Yes u N 0 
This appeal involves (check any that apply) (Provide estimated market value of property) 
• Sales/Use tax D Individual income tax • Corporate Franchise tax • Property tax $ 
D Penalty/Interest • Refund request • Motor vehicle or impound 09 Other (specify): Severance Tax 
Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1999 - 2000 
This appeal involves an assessment, decision, or action by: 
I 8 Auditing Division • Taxpayer Services Division Q Property Tax Division 
Q Motor Vehicle Division • Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division • Other (specify): Severance Tax 
If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date 
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy ot any letter or notice to this petition.) 
Date: 11 /08/04 Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division 
If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the 
vehicle identification number (VIN). 
Impound report no.: License plate no.: VIN: 
Request For Relief 
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary) 
The basis for relief for this appeal is the same as in appeal No. 04-0316, which includes a severance tax appeal for the same petitioner for the 
2001 tax year. The Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing River Gas' natural gas downstream from the well rather than at the well 
for severance tax purposes. 
Matters that come before the Tax Commission are set for a hearing, unless the parties agree to pursue mediation or a decision on the record. 
Check the "Yes" box for each option you agree with. 
• Yes Are you interested in receiving information on our mediation program? 
• Yes Do you believe this matter can be decided on the record without a hearing? If you request a decision on the written record, it is 
your responsibility to make sure all supporting documents, information, and legal authorities are submitted to the Appeals 
Unit with this Petition For Redetermination. If you indicate a preference for a hearing on the record, this matter will be set 
for a Telephone Status Conference so the presiding officer can make a decision on your request 
Name (print or type) 
Steve Young 
Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Apj 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
TC-738 Rev. 10/04 
For assistance with this form, call: (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281 
MPR-03-2004 14:25 GLOBAL FINANCIAL SUCS 918 661 4057 P.02/03 
Before The Utah State Tax Commission 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION 




Petitioner representative. It any (print or type) 
Name 
Mailing address ^ . _ \Malllng address 
Gel forms online * tmLUUULgav,^? 
STEMS Vctuifr 
Firm ffat-AtC ^DPZeTs 4- OlD&J LLP 
tfl SOUTH Mfoti Smesr, Sa\T£#l%oo 
SAur LAKT &ry (Urtti frill I 
Daytime telephone no. ^ 
"WWfc *°*1 Daytime telephone no. FAX telephone no. ^^ 
Account/FEIN/Social Security no. iProperty Parcel number Attach signed authorization or power of attorney. 
Tax Type and Primary Issue 
This appeal Involves (check any that apply) (Provide estimated market value of property) 
D Sales/Use tax D Individual income tax d Corporate Franchise tax D Property tax $„ 
13Penalty/Interest • Refund request D Motor vehicle or Impound 53 Other fsperifv): OU~4 €nA * S£Y£K/fo/6-T TM 
Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: _ 
This appeal Involves an assessment, decision, or action lay: 
Ef Auditing Division • Taxpayer Services Division • Property Tax Division 
D Motor Vehicle Division • Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division • Other (specify): 
If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date 
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of any tetter or notice to this petition,) 
Date; Name and title: _ 
If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the 
vehicle identification number (VIN). 
Itnpound report no.:„ License plate no.:. VIK:. 
Request For Relief 
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary) 
Matters that come before the Tax Commission are set for a hearing, unless the parties aonee to pursue mediation or a decision on the record. 
Check the "Yes" box for each option you agree with. 
D Yes Are you interested in receiving information on our mediation program? 
D Yes Do you believe this matter can be decided on the record without a hearing? [f you request a decision on the written record, it is 
your responsibility to make sure ail supporting documents, information, end legal authorities ere submitted to the Appeals 
Unit with this Petition for Redetermination, if you Indicate a preference for e hearing on the record, this matter will be set 
for a Telephone Status Conference so the presiding officer can make e decision on your request 
Name (print or type) ^ 
Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit 
510 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84134 
OS 
For assistance Wth this form, calfc (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281 
MAR-03-2004 14:26 GLOBfiL FINANCIAL SUCS 918 661 4057 P.03/0Z 
Utah State Tax Commission March 3,2004 
Appeals Division 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-6200 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION - REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
ConocoPhillips requests that the Tax Commission abate the audit deficiency issued by 
the Auditing Division. The issue in dispute is the proper means of valuing and taxing 
coalbed methane production for severance lax purposes under Utah Code Ann, § 59-5-
101, et al. (2001). The Division contends that valuation should occur after gathering and 
compression; at the point the coalbed methane enters the Qucstar pipeline. The Division 
has thus not allowed ConocoPhillips to deduct its expensive compression costs from its 
severance tax value. This Division position is in error because it contradicts Utah Code § 
59-5-102(l)(a), which requires ConocoPhillips to pay severance tax based on a 
percentage of value of gas "at the well." ConocoPhillips contends that its natural gas 
should be valued "at the well," or, because this is a "severance tax," at the point of 
severance, prior to gathering and compression. 
ConocoPhillips' reading of the severance tax statute is especially appropriate given that it 
is a taxing statute (rather than an exemption statute). "In case of doubt," taxing statutes 
are "construed in favor of the taxpayer so as to avoid the levying of taxes by 
imp]icatlon:'Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P2d 266, 271 n.8 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that property tax reimbursements are not considered revenues for 
purposes of determining "value at the well" for severance tax). If the Tax Commission 
has any doubt about the meaning of Utabfs severance tax statutes, those doubts must be 
construed in favor of ConocoPhillips and against the Auditing Division, 
The Audit Division has allowed third party transportation cost of $ ,12/MCF for 2001. 
Our petition asks for additional $ 21/MCF for compression and associated costs. Total 
transportation of $ 31/MCF is not much to ask for if compared to conventional gas. 
Before The Utah State Tax Commission 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION Get forms online - tajLutan.gov-
Petitioner (print or type) 
Name 
Phillips Petroleum Company 
D L B A 
Mailing address
 do D a v i d N , Breibeck 
1110 Plaza Office Building 
Bartlesviile. OK 74044 
Daytime telephone no. 
918-661-3509 
Account/FEIN/Sociai Security no. 
FAX telephone no. 
918-661-0304 
Property Parcel number 
Petitioner's email address 
David.N.Breibeck@conocophiHips.com 
[Petitioner representative, if any (print or type) 
11 authorize the below-named person to discuss and share information 
I concerning this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Name 
Mark K. Buchi or Steven P. Young 
Firm 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
(Mailing address
 2 9 9 S o u l h M a j n S l ree t^ S u j t e 1 8 0 0 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Daytime telephone no. 
801-521-5800 
FAX telephone no. 
801-521-9639 
Representative's email address 
mark.buchi@hro.com or steve.young@hro.com 
Tax Type and Primary issue 
This appeal Involves (check any that apply) (Provide estimated market value of property) 
• Sales/Use tax Q Individual income tax Q Corporate Franchise tax • Property tax $ 
• Penalty/Interest Q Refund request Q Motor vehicle or impound IXl Other (specify!: Oil & Gas Severance Tax 
Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1/1/02 -12/31/02 ^ F" 0 E l l V E D 
This appeal Involves an assessment, decision, or action by: 
S Auditing Division • Taxpayer Services Division • Property Tax Division 
• Motor Vehicle Division • Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division O Other (specify): 
APR 3 0 2008 
APPEALS SECTION 
If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date 
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of arty letter or notice to this petition.) 
Date: 04 / 22 /08 Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division 
If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the 
vehicle identification number (VIN). 
Impound report no.: License plate no.:. VIN: 
Request For Relief 
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary) 
ConocoPhinips requests that the deficiency be abated. The basis for relief is the same as in four other Tax Commission appeals relating to the 
same issue for the same taxpayer for different periods: Appeal Nos. 00-1159 (1994-1998 period, pending before the Utah Second District Court 
as case No. 060700437), 04-1378 (1999-2000 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 
1994-1998 Appeal), 04-0316 (2001 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal), 
and 07-0470 (2003 period, pending before the Tax Commission and set for a status conference on October 1,2008). 
in all of these appeals, the Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing ConocoPhinips' natural gas downstream from the weU rather than 
at the well for severance tax purposes. 
Name (print) le (print) - > Taxpayer's signature jaxpayers signature s\ uaiesignety Date signed/ 
Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
For assistance with this form, call: (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281 
TC-738 Rev. 12/06 
PPOEIVED 
MAY 0 h 2007 
MK t^ALS SECTION 
Before The Utah State Tax Commission 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION Get turms online - tax.utah.gavs 
Petitioner (print or type) 
Name 
ConocoPhililps Company 
D B A 
Mailing address
 do D a v e N , Breibeck 
1110 Plaza Office Bldg 
Bartlesviile, OK 74004 
Daytime telephone no. 
(918)661-3509 
AccounVFEIN/Social Security no. 
N2335 
FAX telephone no. 
(918)661-0304 
Property Parcel number 
Petitioner's email address 
Dave. N.Breibeck@conocophiHips.com 
Petitioner representative, if any (print or type) 
I authorize the below-named person to discuss and share information 
concerning this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Name 
Mark K. Buchi or Steven P. Young 
Firm 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
Mailing address
 2 9 g s M a i n f suite #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daytime telephone no. 
;(801)521-5800 
FAX telephone no. 
(801)521-9639 
Representative's email address 
mark.buchi@hro.com or steve.young@hro.com 
Tax Type and Primary Issue 
(Provide estimated market value of property) 
• Property tax $ 
This appeal Involves (check any that apply) 
• Sales/Use tax D Individual income tax • Corporate Franchise tax 
D Penalty/Interest • Refund request • Motor vehicle or impound BB Other (specify): Oil & Gas Severance Tax 
Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1/1/03 - 12/31/03 
This appeal involves an assessment, decision, or action by: 
H Auditing Division • Taxpayer Services Division • Property Tax Division 
• Motor Vehicle Division • Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division • Other (specify): 
If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date 
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of any letter or notice to this petition.) 
Date: 04 / 1 2 / 0 7 Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division 
If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the 
vehicle identification number (VIN). 
Impound report no.:. License plate no.:. VIN: 
Request For Relief 
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary) 
ConocoPhiiiips requests that the deficiency be abated. While the audit period is 1/1/03 -12/31/05, the deficiency and appeal relate only to 
2003. The basis for relief is the same as in three other Tax Commission appeals relating to the same issue for the same taxpayer for different 
periods: Appeal nos. 00-1159 (1994-1998 period, pending before the Utah Second District Court as Case No. 060700437), 04-1378 
(1999-2000 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal), and 04-0316 (2001 
period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal). 
In all of these appeals, the Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing ConocoPhililps1 natural gas downstream from the well rather than 
at the well for severance tax purposes. 
Name! 
*7yWft> JU&mmK 
Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
For assistance with this form, call: (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281 
12/06 
CLARK L. SNELSON #4673 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P O Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874 
Telephone: (801)366-0375 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIVER GAS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Case No. 060700437 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Pursuant to the Court's Order dated October 19, 2006 granting Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel the specific answers to discovery, Respondent, the Utah State Tax Commission, hereby 
submits supplemental discovery responses as ordered. In so doing, Respondent preserves any 
and all objections as to the admissibility of the information produced. Respondent also notes 
that this information is produced pursuant to direct Order of the Court which has been duly 
informed as to the confidential nature of information presented and as to the statutory restrictions 
on the dissemanation of such information. Having noted its ongoing objections and concerns 
regarding the disclosure of the information the Respondent hereby submits responses to 
interrogatories numbers 4 through 12, number 21, number 22, number 24, number 25 and 
number 26 as well as responses to requests for admissions numbers 1 through 12 and requests for 
production of documents numbers 6 and 7. 
DEFINITIONS 
In responding to these Interrogatories, particularly Interrogatories number 8 and 9, the 
following definitions of specific terms have been relied on by the Utah State Tax Commission 
and should be used in interpreting these responses. 
1. Gross Production - The amount of oil and gas produced by well, obtained form the Utah 
Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, attributable to the applicable lands located in Utah. 
2. Stripper Well Production - No tax is imposed upon production from stripper wells as 
defined under Section 59-5-101. 
3. Wildcat/Development Well Production - No tax is imposed upon the first six months of 
production for development wells, and the first 12 months for wildcat wells, as defined 
under Section 59-5-101. 
4. Exempt Royalty Production - Calculated at an estimated 15% rate against the volume 
remaining after deducting stripper and wildcat/development well production. 
5. Average Price - Compiled from severance tax returns filed with the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
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6. Tax Rates - the tax amount is calculated by applying the applicable tax rates of 3% and 
5% against the taxable value as directed under Section 59-5-102. 
7. Workover/Recompletion Credit - A tax credit of up to 20% for the expenses of a 
workover or recompletion, approved by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, is 
allowed as a deduction. The tax credit is limited to $30,000 per well during each 
calendar year. 
8. Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30, 
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996. 
80% of taxes from new wells beginning production on or after January 1, 2001 
attributable to interests on lands conveyed to the tribe under the Ute-Moab Land 
Restoration Act. 
9. Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30, 
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996, 
for Navajo Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
4. Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible 
for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Uintah 
Basin Revitalization Fund Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116. 
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen. 
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5. Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible 
for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Navajo 
Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen. 
6. Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and 















7. Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and 
the present into the Navajo Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. 







8. Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #6 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE: Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development 
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume. 
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Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax 
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This 
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total 
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount 
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund. 
9. Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #7 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development 
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume. 
Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax 
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This 
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total 
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount 
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund. 
10. For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on 
your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were 
deposited into the Navajo Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSE: The calculation is done on a calendar year basis, therefore the information 
presented below is by calendar year. 
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Oil (BBLS) Gas (MCF) 
2000 5,608,571 4,604,947 
2001 5,021,339 4,346,918 
2002 4,731,507 3,906,534 
2003 4,145,103 3,663,620 
11. For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on 
your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were 
deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSE: The records of the Utah State Tax Commission for severance taxes are kept on a 
calendar year basis. The information presented below is by calendar year. 
Oil (BBLS) Gas fMCF) 
2000 2,290,085 32,693,536 
2001 2,090,550 42,456,262 
2002 2,051,743 50,582,713 
2003 2,204,754 49,148,607 
12. At the March 22, 2005 Formal Hearing before the Tax Commission in appeal no. 
00-1159, Inge-Lise Goss testified at p. 330 of the transcript that from January 1, 2004 to 
December 31, 2004, there was "an increase in the federal royalties monitored by the state" and 
that state severance tax revenues "were up slightly, but not anywhere to that same magnitude" as 
the federal royalties. Identify the specific federal royalty and state severance tax revenues 




Federal Royalties Severance Tax 
2003 $33,926,481 $26,745,279 
2004 $63,033,708 $36,659,808 
21. Identify how many severance tax refund claims are pending before the Tax 
Commission. 
RESPONSE. Ten. 
22. Identify the total amount of each severance tax refund claim pending before the 
Tax Commission. 
RESPONSE: $4,382,173.84. 
24. If the answer to Interrogatory #23 is yes, identify each such sale the Tax 
Commission is aware. 
RESPONSE: We are aware that title to 116,512,780 MCF of gas was transferred at wellhead 
meters for the period of 1994 through 2005. This equates to $424,940,189 in value. 
25. For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the taxpayer 
utilized the value at the wellhead meter for severance tax purposes. 
RESPONSE: Yes. 
26. For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the Auditing 
Division accepted the value at the wellhead meter utilized by the taxpayer as the appropriate 
value under Utah law. 
RESPONSE. Yes. 
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
1 Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission are issued from 
the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
RESPONSE: Tax Commission refunds are issued by State Finance. Severance tax refunds are 
issued from the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
2. Admit that for the period July 1, 1999 to the present, when the Tax Commission 
refunded severance taxes to taxpayers, the Tax Commission did not seek reimbursement for any 
portion of such refunds from the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund or the Navajo Revitalization 
Fund. 
RESPONSE. Respondent admits that it has not sought reimbursement from the Revitalization 
Funds during the period in question. 
3. Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-116 
is based on oil and gas severance tax collections minus oil and gas severance tax refunds for the 
present year. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
4. Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-119 




5. Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no 
impact on the amount of money deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitahzation Fund if the $3 
million cap in Utah Code section 59-5-116(2) is reached. 
RESPONSE Respondent admits that if the cap is reached that severance tax refunds would not 
affect the amount of money deposited into the fund. 
6. Admit that the S3 million dollar cap was reached for the Uintah Basin 
Revitahzation Fund for fiscal years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. 
RESPONSE: The Revitahzation Funds are calculated on a calendar year basis because the 
severance tax is reported and paid on a calendar year. For calendar years 2003, 2004, and 2005 
the $3 million dollar cap was reached. 
7. Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no 
impact on the amount of money deposited into the Navajo Revitahzation Fund if the $2 million 
cap in Utah Code section 59-5-119(2) is reached. 
RESPONSE. Admit. 
8. Admit that a portion of the severance taxes at issue in tax Commission case no. 
00-0901, and which were paid by ExxonMobil from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998, were 
deposited by the Utah State Tax Commission into the Navajo Revitahzation Fund pursuant to 
Utah Code section 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE. Respondent admits that a portion of the taxes paid by ExxonMobil for the period 
9 
in question were eventually credited to the Navajo Revitalization Fund. However, the Tax 
Commission does not technically deposit directly into the fund. 
9. Admit that the Utah State Tax Commission issued a severance tax refund in the 
amount of $2,168,334.87, plus interest, to ExxonMobil between November^21, 2005 and January 
9, 2006 pursuant to the Tax Commission decision in case number 00-0901 dated November 21, 
2005. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
10. Admit that the severance tax refund referenced in Request for Admission #9 was 
paid from the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
11. Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for 
Admission #9 was paid out of Navajo Revitalization Fund funds. 
RESPONSE. Admit that the refund check was issued solely by the State of Utah by State 
Finance. 
12. Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for 
Admission #9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code section 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that no portion of the refund referred to in Admission number 
9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
6. Produce all documents showing how the amounts m Interrogatory No 6 were 
calculated 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
7 Produce all documents showing how the amounts in Interrogatory No. 7 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
DATED this #*ir day of December, 2006. 
Clark L. Snelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Shelley Robj%on 
Utah State Tax Commission 
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